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: Is a Taking Something Lost or Something Gained?

IS A TAKING SOMETHING LOST OR SOMETHING GAINED?
CONTRASTING THE LOSS/GAIN FOCUS OF TAKINGS CASES IN THE
UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA
Duane L. Ostler*
I. INTRODUCTION

American takings law is loss oriented. The starting point of almost every
takings case is the property owner and what he no longer has because of
government action. The property owner is justifiably upset that he has lost
something, and demands that government pay him for it. A property owner will
never question whether this is the right focus. He simply assumes that "taking"
means "loss." How could it be otherwise?
This is especially true in the context of "regulatory takings," which result when
government action significantly diminishes property value without taking it. In this
setting, American courts have focused on the loss or harm to the property ownerparticularly on the degree of that loss-to determine whether a regulatory taking
can even be found.' As noted in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., each of the tests
used by the courts to determine the existence of a regulatory taking "focuses
directly upon the
severity of the burden that government imposes upon private
2
property rights."
It can be argued that the word "taken" should not automatically mean loss.
There are two sides to every story when property is taken; one side suffered a loss,
but another presumably gained. Hence, "takings" pursuant to the Constitution
could just as easily mean gain as loss.3 As one scholar noted, "[t]he concern for
'fairness,' that is the leitmotif of Penn Central, focuses on ... deprivation. A true
takings test would focus not on what the owner has been deprived of (except as a
measure of just compensation), but rather on what the government has taken."
While the United States has never embraced such a "gain" orientation in
respect to takings, there is a country that has. That country is Australia. This is
primarily true in the federal regulatory takings context, when courts must
*
Duane L. Ostler is a graduate of the law school at Brigham Young University in Utah, and practiced
law in Utah for eleven years. At the time this article was written, he was a Research Affiliate with the Centre for
Comparative Law, History and Governance at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia, from which he recently
obtained a Ph.D. in legal history. Currently, he is a postdoctoral research fellow at the T.C. Beime School of Law,
University of Queensland, in Brisbane, Australia.
1.
544 U.S. 528 (2005).
2.
Id. at 539.
3.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4.
Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process Tests and Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence,2007 BYU
L. REV. 899, 901 (urging the U.S. Supreme Court to adopt a "something gained" view of the Takings Clause, just
like that in Australia, as described in this article).
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determine whether an act of government should be classified as a "taking" or an
"acquisition" as takings are commonly referred to in Australia. The Australian
Commonwealth Acquisition Clause bears many similarities to the Takings Clause
in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and was fashioned to
provide essentially the same protections of due process/just terms fairness, public
use or purpose, and compensation.5 However, in recent years, Australian courts
have focused on the "gain" element of the equation, rather than the loss or
deprivation to the property owner. 6 For a taking to even be found by the Australian
High Court, there must be a gain to someone from the government action.7
This article compares and contrasts the loss orientation of American takings
law with the gain orientation of Australian takings law, primarily in respect to
regulatory takings. It begins by tracing the evolution of the loss orientation for
regulatory takings in United States' courts. Next, will be a discussion of the
opposite approach as it has developed in the Australian High Court in recent years.
Finally, a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches will
be analyzed.
As these strengths and weaknesses are reviewed, it will be seen that the "loss"
orientation is derived from a "rights" orientation of protecting individual property
rights. This is essentially classical liberalism. The "gain" orientation is based on
what is best for society, even at the expense of individual rights. This is essentially
classical republicanism. Because of the risk of loss of individual rights from the
"gain" approach, the "loss" approach is still probably the better of the two
approaches. Although it is somewhat inefficient and costly, this approach better
preserves individual freedoms.
It should be noted at the outset that this article will focus on federal
constitutional rather than state constitutional takings clauses in each country. In
America today, the standards and tests applied by the federal courts in respect to
regulatory takings are dominant, since state courts must follow such standards.8
The federal tests apply equally to takings by the federal government and takings by
the states, since under the "incorporation doctrine," Fifth Amendment Takings
5.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. (The relevant portion of the Fifth Amendment reads: ". .. nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."); see AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s. 51 (xxxi) ("The Parliament shall ... have power to make laws

with respect to ... the acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect
of which the Parliament has power to make laws."); see Duane L. Ostler, The Drafting of the Australian
Commonwealth Acquisition Clause, 28(2) UNIV. TASMANIA L. REV. 211 (2009) [hereinafter Ostler, Acquisition
Clause] (discussing how the Australian acquisition clause was similar to the Fifth Amendment and was designed
to provide essentially the same protections). However, some scholars have argued that the two clauses are
radically different, and that the Australian clause was not derived from the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Simon
Evans, Property and the Drafting of the Australian Constitution, 29 FED. L. REV. 121, II.C. (2001); see also
...

PATRICK H. LANE, A MANUAL OF AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 160 (4th ed. 1987).

6.
P.J. Magennis v Commonwealth (1949) 80 CLR 382, 402 (Austl.).
Interestingly, the party receiving the gain does not have to be the government, see LANE, supra note 5,
7.
at 163 ("[Tjhe precise acquirer or use of the subject property is not specified by s. 5 1(xxxi); hence that acquirer or
user need not be the Commonwealth or its agency."). The Australian High Court case espoused this rule in P.J.
Magennis in 1949.
8.
See Duane L. Ostler, A Case of Non-identical Twins-Comparingthe Evolution ofAcquisition Law in
Australiaand the United States, 10 CANBERRA L. REV. 66, 68 (2011) [hereinafter Ostler, Non-identical Twins).
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Clause is applied directly to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 In
Australia, only takings by the federal or Commonwealth government, including
regulatory takings, are subject to the Australian Takings Clause.' 0 The individual
states do not have constitutional takings protections, and the takings standards
established by the federal constitution do not apply to the states as they do in the
United States." Takings at the state level (including regulatory takings) are
controlled almost exclusively by legislation. 2 Notwithstanding this difference, the
highest federal courts in both countries have faced nearly the same questions
regarding interpretation of the federal takings clause in respect to regulatory
takings. In particular, the highest courts in both countries have had to decide
whether to use the "something lost" or "something gained" approach to identify the
existence of regulatory takings.
II. TIHE AMERICAN Loss ORIENTATION

From the days of the founding, it was understood that state and federal takings
clauses were designed to protect private citizens from losses at the hands of
government. The focus was on individual rights and protection of those rights.
Indeed, the various takings clauses were always to be found embedded within the
federal and state bills and declarations of rights. 13 When takings are considered
from the perspective of protection of individual rights, it is only natural that a loss
orientation in favor of the property owner will result. Mr. Sergeant, an attorney for14
the plaintiff, stated in the 1820 Supreme Court case of Satterlee v. Matthewson,
"the fifth Amendment, restricting the exercise of the power of the eminent domain
15
...ought always to be liberally construed in favour of the rights of the citizen."'
Because of this individual rights orientation, the Supreme Court cases which
addressed the issue of whether takings were to have a loss or gain orientation have
almost universally spoken in terms of loss. One of the earliest examples of this
was the 1871 case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. 16 In Pumpelly, a dam owner
maintained that he had no liability for flooding damage to adjacent property caused
9.

See JOSEPH A. MELUSKY & WHITMAN H. RIDGWAY, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: OUR WRITTEN LEGACY 29-

31 (1993) (discussing the "incorporation" doctrine); see Ostler, Non-identical Twins, supra note 8, at 68; see also
U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
10.
See Ostler, Non-identical Twins, supra note 8, at 68.
I.
Id.
at95.
12.
A review by the author of the constitutions of the six Australian states shows that none contain any
takings protection clause. See AUSTRALIAN LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE,

http://www.austlii.edu.au (last

visited Feb. 19, 2012). However, this does not mean that there are no protections in place for state takings. Each
state also has a detailed 'Land Acquisition Act' which limits and describes the manner in which takings can occur.
Id.;
see Donna R. Christie, A Tale of Three Takings: Taking Analysis in Land Use Regulation in the UnitedStates,
Australia, and Canada, 32 BROOK. J.OF INT'L L. 343, 386-90 (2007) (discussing regulatory takings at the state
level, and how such takings are usually protected by way of individual legislation).
13.

See Duane L. Ostler, Bills of Attainder and the Formation of the American Takings Clause at the

Founding of the Republic, 32(2) CAMPBELL L. REV. 227, 231-36 (2010) [hereinafter Ostler, Bills of Attainder]
(discussing the various types of state clauses).
14.
27 U.S. 380 (1829) (dealing with the competing title and leasehold interests in land).
15.
Id. at 406.
16.

80 U.S. 166 (1871).
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by the building of his dam.' 7 He especially relied on the fact that nothing was taken
from his neighbor, arguing that "there is no taking of the land within the meaning
of the constitutional provision," 18 since there were only consequential damages to
the neighbor, and no physical property was appropriated. The court refused to buy
this argument, noting:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in
construing a provision of constitutional law, always understood to
have been adopted for protection and security to the rights of the
individual as against the government ...that if the government
refrains from the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of
the public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable
and permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to total
destruction without making any compensation, because, in the
narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the public use.' 9
This statement highlights the idea, now commonly accepted in the United
States, that a regulation can, by itself, affect a taking. Ever since that time,
20
Pumpelly has been cited as one of the first recognitions of regulatory takings.
Hence, even where physical property is not taken or acquired, a taking can occur
based solely on the loss to the property owner.21 The Court refused to hold that a
taking could not occur unless something was "gained., 22 Accordingly, the rights
orientation of the takings protection trumped any notion that "something gained"
should be just as important, or more important, than "something lost. '23 Indeed,
elsewhere in its opinion the Court concluded that if something had to be gained in
become an instrument of
order for a taking to occur, the takings clause "would
24
oppression rather than protection to individual rights."
The private rights orientation of takings prevailed into the next century. The
presumption was so powerful that "takings" only meant losses that the 1943 case of
United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Powelson spoke of the concept
solely in respect to compensation: 25 "[W]hile it is the owner's loss, not the taker's
gain, which is the measure of compensation for the property taken, not all losses
suffered by the owner are compensable under the Fifth Amendment., 26 The very
17.

Id.at 177.

18.

Id.

19.
Id. at 177-78.
See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 651 (1981); First English
20.
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 317 (1987). Notwithstanding this, one
scholar has argued that there are earlier instances of regulatory takings. See Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of
Regulatory Takings: Setting the RecordStraight, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 1211 (1996).
21.
Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 177-78.

22.

Id.

23.

Id. at 177.

24.

Id. at 179.

25.

319 U.S. 266 (1943).

26.
Id. at 281 (citations omitted). This concept was most recently expressed in Brown v. Legal Found. of
Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 235-36 (2003).
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next sentence offered an interesting clarification: "In absence of a statutory
mandate the sovereign must pay only for what it takes, not for opportunities which
the owner may lose. 27 The intent of these statements was to generally avoid
compensating for consequential damages. 28 However, by linking the concept to
what the government took rather than just what the property owner directly lost, the
Court came very close to acknowledging a gain orientation as the focus in
regulatory takings cases.
In other takings cases over the ensuing years, the United States Supreme Court
would occasionally make similar comments regarding how "gain" rather than
"loss" could potentially be the basis of a takings claim, and particularly that this
could be the tool courts could use to identify the existence of a regulatory taking.
Although, the idea was mentioned once in awhile, it was never taken seriously.
An example can be seen in the 1945 case of United States v. General Motors
Corp.29 At issue was a government takeover of a lease during World War 11.30 The
Court noted:
In its primary meaning, the term "taken" would seem to signify
something more than destruction, for it might well be claimed that
one does not take what he destroys. But the construction of the
phrase has not been so narrow. The courts have held that the
deprivation of the former owner rather than the accretion
of a right
31
or interest to the sovereign constitutes the taking.
The Court then once more linked the concept of "loss" or "gain" in takings to
regulation, noting that "Govenmental action short of acquisition of title or
occupancy has been held, if its effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of
all or most of his interest in the subject matter, to amount to a taking., 32 Whether
the property owner suffered a "destruction" or mere "harm" to his property, the
Court maintained a private rights-oriented loss interpretation in respect to
regulatory takings.33

The 1946 case of United States v. Causby highlighted the issue once again.34 In
this case, a property owner sued under the Fifth Amendment for harm caused to his
chicken farm due to low flying military aircraft; apparently, the chickens were so
27.
Id. at 281-82 (citing United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (1943)).
28.
Consequential damages bear a very close relationship to regulatory takings, and indeed it is often hard
to tell them apart. The majority rule in the United States is against compensation in such cases. See 26 AM. JUR.
2D § 211 (2004) ("[A]s a general rule, in the absence of a constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, a...
governmental agency is not liable to an abutting owner for consequential damages resulting from the grading or
changing of the grade of the street or highway in front of his or her premises."). However, in early American
history, compensation was sometimes given in such cases, in circumstances that would probably more closely
resemble the regulatory takings of today. See Kobach, supranote 20, at 1225.
29.
323 U.S. 373 (1945).
30.
Id. at 374-75.
31.
ld. at 378.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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upset at the noise that they refused to lay eggs.35 Similar to Pumpelly, the
government naturally pointed out that there was no physical taking of property, and
that it had gained nothing since all flights were within the legal minimum height
restrictions of the day.36 The Court disagreed, finding that an "invasion" of the land
37
was sufficient to justify a taking, including the invasion of air shock waves.
rather than any gain (or
However, it was once again the loss to the property owner
38
case.
the
of
outcome
the
determined
that
thereof)
lack
In the 1949 case of Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 39 the Court stated
"[b]ecause gain to the taker . . . may be wholly unrelated to the deprivation

imposed upon the owner, it must also be rejected as a measure of public obligation
4 This was a physical taking of
[i.e., compensation] to requite for that deprivation. '"A
a laundry during World War II on a temporary basis and the previous statement
obviously reiterates the rule from Tennessee Valley Authority, discussed above, that
compensation is to be based on the property owner's loss, rather than the
government's gain.4 In essence, the Court recognized the significantly different
results that can occur if gain is the focus, rather than loss. 4 2 But the "gain/loss"
question was again considered only in respect to compensation. 3
The 1962 case of Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead described how the
"gain/loss" question intersected with the state's police power.44 In this case, the
town of Hempstead, New York, enacted an ordinance that essentially stopped a
mining operation.4 5 The mine owner naturally sued, arguing that the ordinance
constituted a taking.46 The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the ordinance was
a protective measure for the health and safety of the town's residents under the
police power.47 The Court stated:

The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by
individuals of their property as will be prejudicial to the health, the
morals, or the safety of the public, is not . . .burdened with the

condition that the State must compensate such individual owners
for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being
permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon
the community.48

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at256-59.
Id. at260.
Id. at265-66.
Id.
338 U.S. 1(1949).
Id. at5.
Id. at3,5.
Id. at13.
Id.
369 U.S. 590 (1962).
Id.at 590-91.
Id.
Id.at 592.
Id. at 593.
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In so saying, the Court tacitly admitted that a gain had occurred-a gain of
increased safety and health of the citizenry. 49 This was a general social gain, not a
gain of an identifiable property interest or proprietary right. 50 In such cases, the
gain not only outweighs the property owner's loss, but also justifies the denial of
all compensation. 5'
The Court was simply expressing the concept that abatement of a nuisance
under the state's police power is not a compensable taking.52 This was not a new53
holding-similar findings had occurred in a number of cases since the 1800S.
However, as Professor David Thomas noted, in earlier years:
[T]he police power was used mainly for the suppression of
nuisance-causing activities that adversely affected public interests.
In more recent generations, some have come to accept police
power exercises to achieve a much wider range of social benefits.
This more aggressive use of police power has naturally led to a
much wider range of property interests being "taken" by regulation
and supposedly not entitled to compensation. It may be fairly said
that virtually all regulatory takings controversies today are
generated by attempts to use police power in the modem, expanded
fashion.54
Indeed, the Court in Goldblatt acknowledged that extending the nuisance rule
of no compensation to other regulatory contexts was questionable.5 5 Retreating
from the strict rule of no compensation in all state police power cases by noting
that there were times of significant loss in which compensation still may be
required in such a case.56 The Court stated "[t]his is not to say, however, that
governmental action in the form of regulation cannot be so onerous as to constitute
a taking which constitutionally requires compensation. There is no set formula to
determine where regulation ends and taking begins. 57
The famous 1978 case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
expounded further on this concept.5 8 Citing Goldblatt, the Court noted: "[b]ecause
the restriction served a substantial public purpose, the Court thus held no taking
had occurred. It is, of course, implicit in Goldblatt that a use restriction on real
49.
50.

Id.
Goldblat, 369 U.S. at 593.

51.

Id.

52.
Id.
53.
See, e.g., Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878) (no compensation when a law shut down
fertilizer company); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (no compensation when an anti-liquor law shut down
pre-existing brewery); Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905) (no compensation for the loss of garbage
business due to new ordinance); Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915) (no compensation when
the railroad was required to eliminate open drains next to tracks).
54.
David A. Thomas, Finding More Pieces for the Takings Puzzle: How Correcting History Can Clarify
Doctrine, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 497,499-500 (2004).
55.
Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594.
56.
Id.
57.
Id. at 594 (citations omitted).
58.
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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property may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of
a substantial public purpose., 59 Hence, the Court re-emphasized the importance of
a bona fide social welfare gain in takings cases involving the police power and
abatement of a nuisance. 60 Where a law claims to be for a legitimate social
purpose, but in actuality is not, a taking will certainly be found.61 Societal gain is
an essential element in police power/nuisance cases, and can sometimes be enough
to justify a taking with no compensation.62
Analyzing the facts at hand, the Court noted that New York City legitimately
accomplished only its police power goals in preventing the plaintiff from building
above Grand Central Station, but gained nothing else:
[T]he Landmarks Law neither exploits appellants' parcel for city
purposes nor facilitates nor arises from any entrepreneurial
operations of the city. The situation is not remotely like that in
Causby where the airspace above the property was in the flight
pattern for military aircraft. The Landmarks Law's effect is simply
to prohibit appellants or anyone else from occupying portions of
the airspace above the Terminal, while permitting appellants to use
the remainder of the parcel in a gainful fashion. This is no more an
appropriation of property by government for its own uses than is a
zoning law prohibiting, for "aesthetic" reasons, two or more adult
a safety regulation prohibiting
theaters within a specified area, or
63
excavations below a certain level.
However, the Court acknowledged that this was not a pure case of abatement
of a nuisance in which no compensation would be given. 64 Rather, at issue were
historic preservation and aesthetics.65 Hence, even though social gain by the
government justified the taking, a compensable taking could still be found if the
loss or harm to the property owner were great enough.66 The Court stated that, "We
now must consider whether the interference with appellants' property is of such a
magnitude that 'there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain [it].' ' 67 Hence, once again, the traditional loss orientation relating to
individual rights was recognized as the basis of takings law in America. 68 The
majority in Penn Central concluded that the loss was not great enough to find a
taking, although a strong dissent concluded otherwise.69
59.

Id. at 127.

60.

Id.

61.
62.
63.

Id. at 124-26.
Id.at 138.
Id. at 135 (citations omitted).

64.

Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136-38.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 136 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
Id. at 136-38.
Id. at 135 53.

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol17/iss2/5

8

: Is a Taking Something Lost or Something Gained?

Spring 2012

Is a Taking Something Lost or Something Gained?

287

In 1980, issues related to "gain" versus "loss" surfaced again in the case of
Agins v. City of Tiburon.70 The landowner in this case contended that, on its face, a
new zoning ordinance was an unconstitutional taking since it limited what he could
do with his land. 71 The takings claim at issue was therefore a "facial challenge" to
the entirety of the ordinance, rather than an "as applied" challenge to the law only
as applied to a particular property.72 The Court refused to recognize a taking noting
that, "[t]he determination that governmental action constitutes a taking is, in
essence, a determination that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must
bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public interest."73 Hence, once
more the focus was one of balancing losses and gains, as contrasted between
society at large and the private property owner. 74 This point was emphasized by the
Court's holding that a zoning law would constitute a taking if it did not
"substantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically
viable use of his land., 75 The first clause focuses on societal gain; the second on
private loss. 76 The fascinating aspect of this statement was the use of the word "or"
which allowed courts to focus either on gain or loss as the orientation in finding a
taking. This dual approach remained for 25 years, at least in zoning cases, until
Lingle clarified the issue by eliminating the gain orientation.77
The 1981 case of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass 'n dealt
once more with the connection between facial takings challenges and loss/gain in
the takings context. 78 The Court noted that since no specific property was identified
as being harmed, the claimant had only presented a facial challenge to a law which
restricted its ability to pursue coal mining in Virginia. 79 Any "as applied" test,
regarding how the law impacted specific property, was not ripe for review since the
landowner had not exhausted his potential state remedies. 80 The Court stated that in
a facial takings challenge the only test was the loss-oriented one, determining
whether the law "denies an owner economically viable use of his land." 81
Obviously missing was the alternative gain-oriented test given in Agins; that a
taking could also be found if the law did not substantially advance a legitimate
state interest. 82 The omission was apparently purposeful, since the Court had

70.
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
71.
Id. at 258.
72.
Id.
73.
Id. at 260.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. (citations omitted). The "substantially advances" concept was greatly expanded in the exactions
context by the cases of Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374 (1994). In both cases, the United States Supreme Court held that there was no taking when a local
government required a developer to give a portion of his land for a public easement, as long as it was roughly
proportionate to the negative impact of the development.
76.
Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
77.
544 U.S. 528 (2005). See infra text accompanying notes 109-11.
78.
452 U.S. 264 (1981).
79.
id. at 295-96.
80.

Id.

81.
82.

Id. at 296.
Id. at 295-96.
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handed down Agins only the year before.83 In fact, Agins was cited as the source of
the single loss-oriented facial takings test with the "substantially advances"
language omitted. 84 The reason, as suggested years later in Lingle, was probably
context. 85
because the "substantially advances" test was to be limited to the zoning
At any rate, by asserting only the "loss" test in facial takings, the Court
indicated that a facial takings challenge required a showing that the law literally
created a total loss to every property owner it touched in order to be found
unconstitutional! 86 This is an almost impossible standard to meet. Not surprisingly,
the Court decided that because "the Act does not, on its face, prevent beneficial use
of coal-bearing lands ' 87 for other potential purposes, the coal company's challenge
failed the facial test. It should be noted that the three "harm-based" tests for a
regulatory taking in Penn Central8 8 are "as applied" tests, in which the law "as
applied" to the property owner is said to constitute a taking.
The 1982 case of Loretto v. Teleprompter ManhattanCA TV Corp. added a new
twist to the question of whether to focus on "losses" or "gains" in determining if a
taking has occurred. 89 The issue was whether a taking occurred upon the
installation of "about 36 feet of cable one-half inch in diameter and two 4' x 4' x 4'
metal boxes" which altogether occupied "only about one-eighth of a cubic foot of
space." 90 The Court established a "per se" rule that any permanent physical
invasion such as this, no matter how small, constituted a taking. 9' Justice Blackmun
in his dissent pointed out that this new rule flew in the face of recent takings
holdings such as Penn Central, which examined takings from a loss oriented,
harm-based standard.92 Indeed, as Blackmun pointed out, there was hardly any loss
suffered by the property owner here. 93 Hence, Loretto stands for the proposition
that in a pure regulatory taking context the harm must be substantial. 94 However,
where an actual physical invasion occurs, no matter how small, the loss or harm
can be very slight. 95 This suggests that the real basis for finding a taking here was
the government's gain of even a small physical area, rather than the property
owner's loss. 96 Accordingly, Loretto was a rare, recent United States Supreme

83.
84.

Id. at 264.
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295.

85.

544 U.S. 528, 540-41 (2005).

Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295-96.
86.
Id.at 296.
87.
88.
544 U.S. at 538-39. The tests from Penn Central, as summarized in Lingle, are: (1)the economic
impact of the regulation on the property owner, and particularly (2) the degree to which the regulation interfered
with the property owner's "distinct, investment-backed expectations," plus (3) the "character of the governmental
action," as to whether it approached a physical invasion of land, or was an attempt to adjust "the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good. Id.
89.
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
90.
Id. at 443.
91.
ld.at 436-37.
92.
Id. at 444.
93.
Id. at 433-44.
Id. at 426-27.
94.
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436-37.
95.
96.
Id.
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Court case without a strong "loss" orientation because of the physical nature of the
taking. 97

The general rule that takings in the United States are based on losses rather
than gains was stated in the 1984 case of Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.98 Indeed,
this is probably the clearest statement ever made by the United States Supreme
Court to this effect. 99 In this case, the owner of certain trade secrets was required to
disclose them to the EPA in order to obtain a government license.' 00 When the EPA
indicated that it intended to publicly disclose the trade secrets, the owner brought a
takings claim. 01 The Court found that trade secrets were indeed property, and that
some of them were taken, mandating compensation. 0 2 In its opinion, the Court
stated:
The question of what constitutes a "taking" is one with which this
Court has wrestled on many occasions. It has never been the rule
that only governmental acquisition or destruction of the property
of an individualconstitutes a taking, for "courts have held that the
deprivation of the former owner rather than the accretion of a right
or interest to the sovereign constitutes the taking. Governmental
action short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if its
effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of all0or
most of his
3
interest in the subject matter, to amount to a taking."'
Notwithstanding this clear statement of an exclusive "loss" orientation in all
takings cases, the very next year the Supreme Court stated as one of its reasons for
10 4
not finding a taking that "the United States has taken nothing for its own use."
The case was Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., and at issue was a
penalty to employers who withdrew from pension plans.10 5 The penalty was not
found to be a taking. 0 6 The Court made no further comments on the gain/loss
issue. 10 7 Seven years later in another pension case in which no taking was found,
this statement was again quoted, but once again there was no discussion of losses
or gains as the means to identify takings. 0 8
97.
Id.
98.
467 U.S. 986 (1984).
99.
Id.
100.
Id. at 998.
101.
ld.at 999.
102.
Id.
at 1002-03.
103.
Id. at 1004-05 (citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)) (emphasis
added).
104.
475 U.S. 211 (1986).
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602 (1993).
Gain from the government was identified as being "merely incidental" to the regulatory scheme, and had no
bearing on the takings question. Id. Interestingly, in Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), the Court
summarized both Connolly and Concrete Pipe, and seemed to think it significant that in both cases "the
government had not occupied or destroyed the employer's property." Id. at 528. This statement was apparently

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2012

11

Barry Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 5

Barry Law Review

Vol. 17, No. 2

The 2005 Lingle case strongly emphasized the harm-based "loss" orientation of
American takings cases.' 0 9 The Court noted that each of the regulatory takings tests
used by the Court over the years "focuses directly upon the severity of the burden
that government imposes upon private property rights."' 110 The Court ruled that the
"substantially advances" test from Agins is a due process test, not a takings test,
therefore it has no place in a takings analysis."' Hence, no longer could courts
choose between a gain orientation in determining the existence of a regulatory
taking based on whether the law substantially advanced a legitimate state
interest.1 12 This solidified the concept that American regulatory takings
jurisprudence is entirely loss oriented. 1 3 The Court expounded by noting the
"substantially advances" formula suggests a means-ends test: "It asks, in essence,
whether a regulation of private property is effective in achieving some legitimate
public purpose ...

such a test is not a valid method of discerning whether private

14
property has been 'taken' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment."'
The Court explained its reasoning, stating that "[i]nstead of addressing a
challenged regulation's effect on private property, the 'substantially advances'
inquiry probes the regulation's underlying validity."'1 15 The "validity" referred to is
nothing more or less than the question of whether there is a legitimate,
116
constitutionally acceptable gain, while the "effect on property" is the loss.
However, the Court left intact the rule that there was no taking in cases of
abatement of nuisances under the police power in order to obtain a social welfare
gain.117 No taking will be found in nuisance cases "except... [where] 'background
law' independently restrict the owner's
principles of nuisance and property
8
intended use of the property." 1
In sum, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the "loss"
element as essential in all regulatory takings." 9 While a gain orientation has
sometimes been suggested as an alternative, the loss orientation has always won
out in the end. 20 A regulatory taking will be found if the loss to the property from
the government action is great enough. ' 2' This point is derived from the individual
rights orientation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 22 Where the takings
clause is seen primarily as a protection of individual rights, a loss orientation is an

offered as justification for the fact that no taking was found. Once again however, there was no further discussion
of the point.
109.

544 U.S. 528 (2005).

110.
Ill.

Id. at 539.
Id. at 532.

112.
113.

Id.
Id.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 542.
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
Id.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 538 (citing Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026-32 (1992)).

119.
120.

See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546.
Id. at 547.

121.

Id. at 548.

122.

Id.

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol17/iss2/5

12

: Is a Taking Something Lost or Something Gained?

Spring 2012

Is a Taking Something Lost or Something Gained?

unavoidable consequence. 123 However, the strong loss orientation does not apply in
respect to physical takings. 124 Where very small amounts of physical property are
taken and
therefore little loss to the property owner occurred, a taking may still be
125
found.

I1. TuE AUSTRALIAN COMPARISON
The Australian High Court has acknowledged the similarities between the
Australian Takings Clause and that of the United States Constitution. 26 The
Australian Takings Clause is found at sec 51 (xxxi) of the Australian Constitution,
and states that Parliament shall have power to make laws with respect to "the
acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in
respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws."'1 27 Although the wording
is clearly different from the Fifth Amendment-being expressed as a grant of
power rather than as a restriction on power-the intended scope of the clause was
far more similar than one might think at first. 28 In spite of its expression as a grant
of power, the context shows that Edmund Barton, 2 9 who proposed the clause, was
far more interested in defining limits to the eminent domain power than providing
an explicit grant of the power.' 30 Indeed, he and many others at the convention
never doubted the government's inherent power to take.' 3' The Australian
Constitutional Convention had discussed, and rejected, a proposed due process
clause.' 32 Hence, Barton knew that his proposed takings clause could not contain
the words "due process." But, he also believed that any meaningful takings
protection needed an effective fairness element; therefore, he inserted the phrase
"just terms" to mean essentially the same thing as due process in the takings
context. 133 Compensation was not mentioned, but was understood to be an essential
element. 34 The "public use" protection was worded differently, as the necessity for
123.
Id.
124.
Id. at 548.
125.
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548.
126.
See, e.g., Andrews v Howell (1941) 65 CLR 255, 282 (opinion of Dixon, J.); Wurridal v
Commonwealth (2009) 237 CLR 309 (opinion of Kirby, J.).
127.

See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s.51 (xxxi).

128.
Id.; Ostler, Acquisition Clause, supra note 5 at 223-35.
129.
Edmund Barton was one of the principal delegates at the Constitutional Convention, and came from
Australia's largest state of New South Wales. See JOHN REYNOLDS, EDMUND BARTON (1948), for a more detailed
discussion of his life and contributions.
130.
See Ostler, Acquisition Clause, supra note 5, at 223-35.
131.
Id. at 226-27.
132.
See Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates 667, 690 (Third Session)
(Melbourne: 1898).
133.
In 1915, Justice Barton of the Australia High Court, explained what he had meant by "just terms." He
noted "in some of the States of the American Union the power of expropriation is limited by their Constitutions to
acquisition on just terms." NSW v Commonwealth (1915) 20 CLR 55, 78 (emphasis added). Significantly, none of
the American state constitutions have ever used the phrase, 'just terms.' However, almost all of them use the
phrase 'due process' or 'law of the land.' Clearly, Barton was referring to due process as the essence of the
Australian concept of fairness embodied in 'just terms.' He had been unable to propose the use of the words 'due
process,' since the Constitutional Convention had already explicitly rejected a proposed due process clause. See
Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates 667, 690 (Third Session) (Melbourne: 1898).
134.
NSW, (1915) 20 CLR 55, 78.
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a public "purpose.' ' 5 However, the context shows that the Australian founders had
136
nearly the same intent with this part of the clause as the Fifth Amendment.
Hence, both the Australian and American takings clauses contain the basic three
takings protections-fairness (due process or just terms), public use and
compensation.
Early High Court cases interpreting the acquisition clause universally followed
the pattern then existing in the United States; takings occurred where there was a
loss to the property owner, rather than a gain by the Commonwealth or a third
party. 137 Verbiage in the 1948 case of Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth
indicated that-just as in the U.S.-not only could the loss of physical property be
classified as a taking, but a regulation which diminished property rights could be as
well. 138 Justice Dixon stated:
s. 51 (xxxi.) is not to be confined pedantically to the taking of title
by the Commonwealth to some specific estate or interest in land
recognized at law or in equity and to some specific form of
property in a chattel or chose in action similarly recognized, but
that it extends to innominate and anomalous interests and includes
the assumption and indefinite continuance of exclusive possession
and control for the purposes of the Commonwealth of any subject
of property. '9

Justice Dixon summed up this view by noting that the Australian
Commonwealth takings clause "provides the individual or the State ... a protection
against governmental interferences with his proprietary rights without just
recompense." 140 Just as in America, the focus was on the protection of individual
rights. 14 1 With this idea in mind, regulatory
takings were naturally seen as loss
142
oriented, just as in the United States.
However, starting in the early 1980s, the focus of the Australian High Court in
takings cases became one of gain, rather than loss. The first such case to make this
proposal was the 1983 case of Commonwealth v Tasmania, sometimes known as
the "Tasmanian Dam" case. 143 At issue was whether the Commonwealth's denial of
the State of Tasmania's proposed construction of a dam in a state park constituted a
taking. 144 A majority of the justices said that no taking had occurred, primarily
135.
Ostler, Acquisition Clause, supra note 5, at 235-38.
136.
Id.
137.
For cases in which this standard was followed, see, e.g., Andrews v Howell, (1941) 65 CLR 255; Grace
Brothers Pty Ltd v Commonwealth, [ 1946] HCA 11; (1946) 72 CLR 269.
138.
[ 1948] HCA 7; (1948) 76 CLR 1. This case was subsequently appealed to the Privy Council in London,
which upheld the Australia High Court's ruling. See Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales (1949) 79 CLR
497; [1950] AC 235.
139.
Id. at 349.
140.
Id.
141.
Id.
142.
Id.
143.
(1983) 158 CLR 1 (1983)46 ALR 625.
144.

Id.
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because-in spite of how much the State of Tasmania claimed it lost from not
being able to build its dam-neither the federal government nor anyone else had
gained any "proprietary right.', 145 There was a strong dissent from Justice Deanne,
who noted that the power to prevent a proposed project "can constitute a valuable
asset., 146 He then pointed out:
[T]he Commonwealth has.., obtained the benefit of a prohibition,
which the Commonwealth alone can lift ... the practical effect of
the benefit obtained by the Commonwealth is that the
Commonwealth can ensure, by proceedings for penalties and
injunctive relief if necessary, that the land remains in the condition
which the Commonwealth, for its own purposes, desires to have
conserved. In these circumstances, the obtaining by the
Commonwealth of the benefit acquired under the Regulations is
properly to be seen as a purported acquisition of property for a
purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make
1 47
laws.
Justice Deane's comments highlighted the issue of social welfare gain, which
was sometimes mentioned in the American cases. 148 After all, by definition, any
time government feels it is important enough to take an action that limits a property
owner's rights, it must have had some motivation (some gain) for doing so. 149 The
question was whether a police power/social welfare type of gain should be a factor
in determining the existence of a regulatory taking. 5 0 What was significant was the
High Court's conclusion in
this case that social gain is no gain at all, by the
15
1
else.
anyone
or
government
The High Court struggled with the "gain/loss" issue again in the 1994 case of
Georgiadis v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corp.'52 In this case, a
new law effectively took away a claimant's right to bring a worker's compensation
suit. 153 There was much discussion on the High Court regarding whether a
"proprietary right" had been gained, especially in light of the government's
145.

Id.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. (Deanne, J., dissenting).
Id.
See supra discussion on the American Loss Orientation and text accompanying notes 50-69, 117.
(1983) 158 CLR 1.
Id.

151.

Id.

152.
[1994] HCA 6; (1994) 119 ALR 629; (1994) 179 CLR 297 (Austl.).
153.
Id.U.S. courts also recognize that "a vested cause of action is property." Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290
U.S. 326, 332 (1933). However, there is no property right in a particular remedy pertaining to that cause of action.
Id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not clearly ruled on the issue of when vesting of the right occurs. The
majority of the circuit courts hold that the right does not vest until a final, unreviewable judgment has been
obtained. See, e.g., Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 12 (1986) (a right to a cause of action does not vest
"until a final, unreviewable judgment is obtained"); Ileto v. Glock, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1299 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
("every circuit court to address the issue has ... concluded that no vested property right exists in a cause of action
unless the plaintiff has obtained a final, unreviewable judgment"). Unlike Australia, no takings case regarding a
cause of action as a property right has been addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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argument that the right to sue was merely extinguished, and no one had "gained"
it. 154 A majority of the Court (including Justice Deane) determined that a taking

had indeed occurred, since the government had gained the money it otherwise
would have had to pay in a worker's compensation claim. 55 Hence, the gain was
quantified, rather than characterized as a social welfare gain. 56 Since a proprietary
right had been gained, a taking had occurred. 157 Thus, the Court stuck precariously
to the "gain of a proprietary right" argument. 5 8 In wording similar to that of United
States v. GeneralMotors Corp.,' 59 the Court stated:
"Taking" directs attention to whether there has been a divesting, a
question which is answered by looking to the position of the
person who claims that he has been deprived of his property. On
the other hand, "acquisition" directs attention to whether
something is or will be received. If there is a receipt, there is no
reason why it should correspond precisely with what was taken.
so with "innominate and anomalous
That is 1particularly
6°
interests.

'

The reference to "innominate and anomalous interests" is taken, of course,
from Justice Dixon's statement in Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth, and
refers to regulatory takings. 161 This statement highlights better than any other the
semantic nature of the issue. 62 The words "take" or "taking" tend to bring to mind
the concept of a forced transfer between parties, with emphasis on the loss of the
one losing the property. 63 The words "acquire" or "acquisition" tend to bring to
mind some form of gain by the one receiving the property. '64 Hence, the fact the
Fifth Amendment used the word "taken" and s. 51(xxxi) used the word
"acquisition" has apparently had an impact on how reviewing courts have dealt
65
with takings in each country.'
The majority in Georgiadis was well aware of the fine line it was drawing in
deciding the case as it did. 66 Indeed, the Court acknowledged that, similar to
balancing tests used in the United States to find a regulatory taking based on the
severity of the loss, there was an undeniable element of "ad hoc" balancing in
finding a regulatory taking based on gain. 167 The majority stated:
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

(1994) 179 CLR 297.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

159.

323 U.S. 373 (1945); see also supra text accompanying notes 29-33.

160.
161.
162.
163.

46 ALR at 633; (1994) 179 CLR 297 (Austl.).
See Commonwealth v Bank ofNew South Wales (1949) 79 CLR 497.
(1994) 179 CLR 297.
Id.

164.

Id.

165.
166.
167.

Id.
(1994) 179 CLR 297.
Id.
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295

One consequence of s. 51(xxxi)'s operation through
characterization and concern with substance is that there will
inevitably be borderline cases in which the question whether a law
bears the distinct character of a law with respect to the acquisition
of property ...

is finely balanced. The present is such a case. On

balance, we have reached the 168
conclusion that [this case] does
possess such a distinct character.
The dissenters point out the inconsistencies in the majority's position,
particularly in maintaining that something was "gained."' 169 In his comments,
Justice Toohey acknowledged the close parallels between the approach that
something was gained or something was lost. 170 He said:
No doubt the defendant has benefited from the operation of s.44 of
the Act in that a person in the position of the plaintiff can no
longer recover damages for non-economic loss. But that falls far
short of saying that there was an acquisition of property by the
defendant. The dichotomy between extinguishment and acquisition
cannot be pressed too far; the two are not necessarily
incompatible.171
The "something gained-something lost" debate continued to surface in
subsequent Australian High Court cases. 172 The parties in takings cases were aware
of the prior case law which said that some proprietary right had to be acquired in
order for a taking to be found. 173 Those who asserted a taking, therefore, were
always able to come up with some kind of "gain" to the government, while the
government always argued lack of any gain, usually citing the "Tasmanian Dam"
case as support. 174 The Court was left to decide whether the asserted "gain" 75was
really the type of gain that made a difference in the regulatory takings context. 1
An example is the 1997 case of Newcrest Mining v Commonwealth. 176 In this
case, a new federal law prohibited mining in a national park in the Northern
Territory. 177 Newcrest Mining held a lease to mine in the park, and was prevented
from doing so. 78 Naturally, it brought suit, arguing a taking contrary to just
terms. 179 The Commonwealth argued:
168.
Id. at 308.
169.
Id.
170.
(1983) 158 CLR 1.
171.
Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
172.
Newcrest Mining v Commonwealth, (1997) 190 CL.R. 51 (Austl.); Commonwealth v Mewitt, (1997)
191 C.L.R. 471 (Austl.); Commonwealth v WMC Resources, (1998) 152 ALR I (Austi.).
173.
Id.
174.
(1949) 79 CLR 497.
175.
(1983) 158 CLR 1.
176.
[1997] HCA 38; (1997) 190 CLR 51; (1997) 147 ALR 42.
177.

Id.

178.
179.

Id.
Id.
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[B]y making the proclamations it did not acquire any property in
any of the leases .. .the prohibition produced no benefit of a

proprietary nature for the Commonwealth or the Director. The
proclamations may have prevented Newcrest from mining the land
but neither the Commonwealth nor the Director received any
corresponding advantage. 1
Therefore, once again the government argued since no gain had occurred, no
taking should be found.' 8' This is very similar to the dam owner's argument in
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., or the argument of the Air Force in United States v.
Causby.'82 The Justices in the opinion debated this point; some in favor, others
against. Justice McHugh argued:
[E]ven if there was effectively a diminution or extinguishment of
all or part of Newcrest's interests, there was no gain by the
Commonwealth... Both as a matter of substance and of form, the
Commonwealth obtained nothing which it did not already have. In
terms, Newcrest lost but the Commonwealth did not
colloquial
''83
gain.
On the other hand, Justice Brennan argued that the Commonwealth had indeed
gained something: "What was acquired was the benefit of the extinguishment of
Newcrest's rights to carry on operations for the recovery of minerals."'' 84 Clearly,
Justice Brennan had changed his thinking since the Commonwealth received a very
similar type of social benefit type of gain in the "Tasmania Dam" case, but he had
claimed in that case the Commonwealth had gained nothing. 85 Ultimately, a slim
justices found in favor of a "gain" rather than a "loss," and a taking
majority of the
86
was found.

1

Subsequent Australian High Court cases continued to focus on the "something
gained" criteria, frequently in the context of a law that limits or changes the right of
a claimant to bring suit, as in Georgiadis 87 Indeed, in the 1997 case of
Commonwealth v Mewitt, 188 the specific issue was once again whether loss of a
right to sue constituted a taking, and whether the Georgiadis decision should be
overruled. A majority of the Court (including the dissenters from Georgiadis) said
that Georgiadis should not be overruled, and that a taking had occurred when the
government limited the right to sue.' 8 9 Justice Dawson acknowledged that finding
180.

Id. at 81.

181.

Id.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Causby, 328 U.S. at 265.
190 CLR 51.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id.

187.

(1983) 158 CLR 1.

188.
189.

[ 1997] HCA 29; (1997) 146 ALR 299 (Austl.).
Id.
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the existence of a gain sufficient for a taking was largely a matter of opinion, on
which the justices differed. 190 He stated:
The difference between the majority and the minority [in
Georgiadis] went not so much to principle as to its application in
the particular circumstances, the majority preferring a broader
approach than the minority in determining what amounts to an
acquisitionofproperty within the meaning of s. 51(xxxi). 19 1
The loss/gain issue surfaced again in Commonwealth v WMC Resources.1 92 At
issue was a law which effectively terminated a seabed mining right held by 93
a
private company, in an area of the sea disputed between Australia and Indonesia.'
This time, a majority of the Justices determined that no taking had occurred, even
though the mining company had clearly lost something.' 94 Each Justice addressed95
the question of whether any "gain" had occurred that would give rise to a taking.'
Two found a gain; four did not. 196 The fact there could be such a divergence over
whether a "gain" had occurred among such learned judges speaks volumes by
itself.' 97 In an interesting comparison between the rights-orientation of America's
Fifth Amendment, contrasted with the Australian High Court's focus on gain rather
than loss, Justice McHugh stated, "If s 51 (xxxi) of the Australian Constitution was
a guarantee of property rights in the way that the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution' 98is a guarantee of property rights, the result of this case might
well be different."'
In the 2000 case of Smith v ANL Ltd, the Court once again refused to overrule
Georgiadis, and instead extended its reach. 99 Once more, a new law restricted a
20
right to bring a claim against the government.
In Smith, however, the claimant
20 1
did not lose the right as in Georgiadis, but was subjected to a six month time
limit in which to bring his claim. 20 2 The Court ruled this too was a taking. 20 3 The

reason was summed up succinctly by Justice Gleeson, "[T]he appellant's preexisting common law right was modified; and a corresponding benefit was

190.
Id.
191.
Id. at 310.
192.
There were two such cases. In the first in 1996, the Federal Court of Australia, General Division, found
a taking. See Commonwealth v WMC Resources (1996) 136 ALR 353 (Austl.). This decision was then appealed to
the High Court, which reversed in 1998, finding no taking. See Commonwealth v WMC [1998] HCA 8; (1998) 152
ALR I (AustI.).
193.
Id.
194.
Id.
195.
Id.
196.
Id.
197.
Id.
198.

Commonwealth v WMC (1998) 152 A.L.R. 11, 11149.

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

[2000] HCA 58; (2000) 176 ALR 449.
Id. at 498, 1I1.
Georgiadis, 119 ALR 629.
Smith, 204 CLR at 499, 5.
Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2012

19

Barry Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 5

BarryLaw Review

Vol. 17, No. 2

conferred on the respondent. ''204 The benefit, of course, was government becoming
free from claims once the six month time limit had passed. However, Justice
Gleeson acknowledged that the government could try to dodge the "something
gained" question by craftily writing its laws in a way that created an appearance of
no gain.20 5 The language he used unquestionably supported the private rights/loss
orientation of the takings clause, as he noted "a guarantee protecting rights of
private property could be rendered worthless by the adoption of a drafting
a result having no practical
technique that would produce, for the citizen 20affected,
6
difference from the result of extinguishment.
Two of the Justices in Smith choose to elaborate the problems and logical
inconsistencies with the fixation on "something gained" as the touchstone for
regulatory takings cases.20 7 Justice Kirby noted that it is possible to find
"something gained" in almost any taking: "[n]ot infrequently, property rights are
acquired under federal law for the precise purpose of extinguishing them, that
being the very object of the acquisition., 20 8 This reference appears to be, once
more, in respect to a social welfare gain for the entire community. 20 9 Additionally,
Justice Kirby acknowledged the extreme difficulty in finding a proper dividing line
in cases of this type, noting that "[f]inding a touchstone to distinguish legislation
of s 51(xxxi) is
which falls within, and that which falls outside, the requirements
210
not easy. No verbal formula provides a universal criterion.,
Justice Callinan noted that attempts to limit the "gain" sufficient for a taking to
traditional, physical types of "property rights" was too simplistic. 21l He stated:
[W]hat has been acquired may often be without any analogue in
the law of property and incapable of characterization according to
any established principles of property law. The powers of the State
to take and effect property are far reaching and the means by
which this may be done are almost innumerable.21 2
He then struck at the heart of the perceived difference between "something
lost" and "something gained," in these words:
There are also statements in some of the cases which place
significance on a shade of perceived difference in meaning
between the word "taken" in the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and "acquisition" in s 51(xxxi) of the
Australian Constitution . . .In my opinion there is little or no
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 500, 7.
Id.at 500-01.
Id. at 500, 7.

207.
208.

Id.
Smith, 204 CLR at 521,

209.
210.

Id.
Id. at 528-29,

211.

Id.

212.

Id. at 542,

78.

100.

157.

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol17/iss2/5

20

: Is a Taking Something Lost or Something Gained?

Spring 2012

Is a Taking Something Lost or Something Gained?

299

significance to be attached to any apparent shade of difference in
meaning between the two words, "take" and "acquire. ' 13
Justice Callinan then bluntly pointed out the logical inconsistency of the gain214
He noted that
oriented, "proprietary rights" nature of the Australian takings test.
acquisition cases always came to the courts on the claim that someone's proprietary
right was at issue (i.e., something was lost). 215 Yet, the Court always flipped and
reached its conclusion about the acquisition on whether there had been "something
gained" by an entirely different party. 21 6 For Justice Callinan, the whole approach
of the Australian High Court was schizophrenic.21 7 He drove the point home with
one more punch-if the High Court truly only found takings where something had
been gained,why did it then value the taking (for purposes of compensation) based
on what the property owner had lost?2 1 8 Wouldn't the value gained be more
accurate,
if gain was really the best determining factor of the existence of the
2 19
taking?
Justice Callinan agreed with Justice Kirby that it was possible to find
"something gained" if the court looked hard enough. 220 He noted that, in every
recent taking case, "it is not difficult to see how the Commonwealth, or somebody
else did derive some form of benefit .,,221 Thus, every taking case just boiled
down to personal opinions of the Justices, since "[a] distinction may be very much
in the eyes of the beholder., 222 For Justice Callinan, the "Tasmanian Dam" case
was a prime example since there had been an obvious gain in the form of
attainment of the Commonwealth's goal in stopping Tasmania's proposed dam.223
In the 2007 case of Attorney Generalfor the Northern Territory v Chaffey, the
Court seemed to retreat somewhat from the vigor of its prior "something gained"
cases. 224 A Northern Territory statute effectively reduced a worker's compensation
claim held by Mr. Chaffey. 225 He sued, alleging a violation of the takings clause
applicable in the Northern Territory.22 6 The Court ruled that no acquisition had
occurred.227 The distinction which allowed this conclusion was that workers
compensation was based on a statutory grant, and was therefore not the type of

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Smith, 204 CLR at 545-46, Ini 164, 167.
Id. at 547, 168.
ld.at543, 159.
Id.
at547, 168.
Id.

218.

Id.

219.

Id.

220.
221.

Smith, 204 CLR at548,
Id.

222.
223.

Id. at 550, 1 177.
Id.at546, 166.

224.

(2007) 231 C.L.R. 651.

173.

225.

Id.
at 661,1 I11-12.

226.

Id. at 659, 1 2, 661-62, 1 14; see also Northern Territory (Self Government) Act 1978 (Cth) ss 5, 6, 50.

It should be noted that the individual Australian states are not subject to the Commonwealth takings clause, but
may provide their own takings limitations. See NSW v Commonwealth (1915) 20 C.L.R. 55, 78. However, the

territories are subject to federal (Commonwealth) law.
227.

Alt 'y Gen., 231 CLR at 665-666,
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In other words, this
property right the "just terms" clause was meant to protect.
was a mere statutory adjustment that incidentally affected someone's entitlement,
rather than a taking. 229 This is a fine distinction which could obviously swallow the
rule since in the process of statute-making, an "adjustment" to an "entitlement"
could almost always be found. Indeed, just how was the workers compensation
claim in Georgiadis any different?2 30 Both Justice Kirby and Callinan once again
noted their dissatisfaction with the current state of acquisition law, but reluctantly
joined in the decision nonetheless. 31
The most recent case to significantly discuss the "something gained" aspect
of acquisition law was the 2009 case of ICM Agriculture Party Ltd. v
Commonwealth.2 32 Here, the government eliminated groundwater bore licenses and
a new licensing requirement was imposed which allowed the removal of less
233
lost much of their water sued, asserting a taking. 234 In
water.2 33 Those who had
keeping with the "something gained" focus, three of the Justices quoted from a
prior case, Mutual Pools & Staff PartyLtd. v Commonwealth,23' acknowledging the
difficulty of the "something gained" analysis:
[T]he fact remains that s 51 (xxxi) is directed to "acquisition" as
distinct from deprivation. The extinguishment, modification or
deprivation of rights in relation to property does not of itself
constitute an acquisition of property. For there to be an
"acquisition of property," there must be an obtaining of at least
some identifiable benefit or advantage relating to the ownership or
use of property. On the other hand, it is possible to envisage
circumstances in which an extinguishment, modification or
deprivation of the proprietary rights of one person would involve
an acquisition of property by another by reason of some
benefit or advantage
identifiable and measurable countervailing
23 6
accruing to that other person as a result.
In short, someone's loss frequently meant that someone else had
correspondingly gained.237 Although the Justices were willing to admit that a loss
by one usually corresponded to a gain by another, they were unwilling to find it
here. 238 The bore licenses at issue related to water, "a natural resource, and the
228.

Id.

229.
Id.at 666, 32.
230.
Id. at 671, n.82. None of the justices even attempted to answer this question. Georgiadis was only
mentioned in footnotes, and not in the comments of any of the justices.
231.
232.

Id. at 671, 1151-52.
240 CLR 140.

233.
Id.at 159, 6.
234.
Id.at 160, 8.
235.
[1994] HCA 9; (1994) 179 C.L.R. 155, 185 (Austl.). This was a somewhat convoluted case regarding a
refund of a swimming pool tax and it dealt primarily with the distinction between taxes and takings.
236.

ICM, (2009) 240 CLR at 179-80, 1182.

237.
238.

Id.
Id. at 180, 84.
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State always had the power to limit the volume of water to be taken from that
resource. ' 239 In short, bore licenses cannot be categorized as a "proprietary right,"

whose gain would indicate the existence of an acquisition.
Kiefel, and Bell were essentially in agreement. 24' They noted:

240

Justices Hayne,

[T]here can be no acquisitionof property unless some identifiable
and measurable advantage is derived . . . That is, another must

acquire "an interest in property, however slight or insubstantial it
may be." The only possible recipient of an advantage in this matter
is the State. Did it derive some advantage
from replacing the bore
242
licenses or reducing water entitlements?
Their answer was a simple but emphatic "no.

243

In sum, the Australian High Court initially viewed the Australian
Commonwealth takings clause as a protection of private rights, in which regulatory
takings could be found if a property owner suffered a ,Ioss.,, 24 4 Beginning in 1983,
the focus shifted.2 45 Today, in order to find a federal constitutional taking, there
must be an identifiable gain of a proprietary right.246 If there is not, irrespective of
any loss to the property owner, no taking will be found. 247 The High Court has
struggled with this approach, as seen through its inconsistent and contradictory
opinions. Exceptions to the rule have been found when government merely "adjusts
entitlements," or acts in respect to matters in which there are no proprietary rights,
such as in the case of water rights.2 48
IV. INTERPRETIVE CONSIDERATIONS
As discussed above, Courts in both countries have struggled over whether a
taking is something gained, or something lost. Loss orientation prevails in the
United States, and is never seriously questioned. 249 However, in Australia,
originally a loss orientation was followed, but in recent years has been replaced
with a gain orientation. 25 Hence, the highest courts in each country now interpret
takings questions in radically different ways.
There are a number of problems inherent in each approach. When a taking is
viewed as something lost, government faces continuous claims for compensation.
This results in potentially large expenditures of public funds in cases where there
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id.
Id. at 181,1189.
Id. at 182, 201-02.
240 CLR at 201-02 (citation omitted).
Id. at 202, 1149.

244.

Bank ofNew South Wales, (1948) 76 C.L.R. I.

245.
246.
247.

Tasmania, (1983) 46 A.L.R. 625.
1CM, (2009) 240 CLR at 179-80; Mutual Pools, (1994) 179 CLR at 185.
See 1CM, (2009) 240 CLR at 181.

248.
249.

See Att "yGen., (2007) 231 CLR at 666; 1CM, (2009) 240 CLR at 181.
Lingle, 544 U.S. 528 (2005).

250.

Bank of New South Wales, (1948) 76 CLR 1; see 1CM, (2009) 240 CLR at 181.
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was little, if any, gain to anyone. The burden falls on society to continually
reimburse individuals with little to show from it. On the other hand, if the focus is
solely on something gained, individual rights may be abused and private property
owners may find themselves footing the bill for public projects.
In reviewing these issues, a few key considerations arise repeatedly and must
be considered. These issues are: republicanism versus liberalism; the meaning of
the term "property;" and the challenge of quantification. Each issue will be
discussed in turn, followed by a conclusion about which approach-gain or lossis arguably the better one.
A. Republicanism v. Liberalism
At its heart, the question of "something gained/something lost" focuses on a
simple theoretical question; which is more important: protecting individuals from
invasions by society or protecting society from rampant individualism that may
destroy the cohesion of society? This is the very essence of the debate between
liberalism and republicanism. Speaking of republicanism at the time of America's
founding, Gordon Wood stated, "[t]he sacrifice of individual interests to the greater
of the whole formed the essence of republicanism . ... 251 Liberalism is the
opposite and focuses on individualism as the pre-eminent concern, with societal
goals being secondary.2 5 2 William Michael Treanor expounded further on the
theory of liberalism:
Liberalism begins with the belief that individuals are motivated
primarily, if not wholly, by self-interest and with the belief that
rights are prepolitical. Government exists to protect those rights
and the private pursuit of goals determined by self-interest.
Republican thinkers, in contrast, see the end of the state as the
promotion of the common good and of virtue. Rights, rather than
being prepolitical, are created by the polity and subject to
limitation by the polity when necessitated by the common interest.
Whereas liberals are comfortable with economic self-interest,
republicans have a profoundly ambivalent stance toward private
property.2 53
Liberalism, with its focus on protecting individual rights, is closely tied to the
analysis of "something lost. '254 A regulatory taking will only be found when the

251.
GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 53 (1969); JAMES W. ELY,
Jr., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 33 (3d ed. 2008) ("[Tjhe theory of republicanism, influential during
the revolutionary era, subordinated private interests to the pursuit of public welfare.").
See generally William Michael Treanor, The Original Understandingof the Takings Clause and the
252.
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 821 (1995) (describing differences between liberalism and
republicanism).
253.
Id.
254.
Christie, supranote 12, at 353.
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individual loss is great enough. 255 Republicanism, with its focus on the betterment
of society as a whole, is tied to the "something gained" point of view.256 Under this
view a regulatory taking will be found only when society has gained something,
regardless of how much loss any individual may have suffered.
The debate between liberalism and republicanism has continued for decades,
and is not likely to end any time soon. It is noteworthy that both schools of thought
recognize compensation for takings, albeit under different criteria.257 As Treanor
has said:
Republican and liberal attitudes towards compensation should not
be viewed as polar opposites. Under both schools of thought,
compensation was considered the norm. The republican school,
however, believed that the ultimate decision of whether to
compensate the affected individual was to be resolved by the
ordinary political process; the liberal believed that the obligation to
compensate existed258 outside of that process and could not be
compromised by it.

Even though compensation is recognized under both of the theories, it is less
likely to be awarded under republicanism than liberalism. There may be times that
granting compensation would elevate the individual's needs above societal needs,
which republicanism could never allow. Therefore, the two points of view are
fundamentally at odds.
Viewing takings as losses tends to emphasize a "me" orientation-highlighting
the needs and rights of the individual over those of society, as protection of the
individual and his claimed property rights reigns supreme. Conversely, if the
takings or acquisition clauses are not viewed as a protection, but are based on the
concept that the government has the power and the right to take for the good of
society, then a "something gained" orientation follows. The overall goals of society
become more important than those of the individual, although individuals are still
to be treated fairly by reasonable compensation for legitimate losses due to a
taking. When the focus is on the good of society, the belief is that individuals
should not hold society hostage and demand a hefty "ransom" every time they
suffer a loss. Under this view, individuals should frequently not be compensated at
all, or given only very little compensation since society's goals are far more
important.
While the "loss" orientation of liberalism is the norm in the United States and
was initially followed in Australia, it should be noted that courts in both countries
have also followed a republicanism standard to an extent, since the highest courts
in both countries have indicated that some circumstances fall outside the ambit of
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 377.
Id. at 353.
Treanor, supra note 252, at 826, n.226.
Id.
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traditional takings protections, and therefore no compensation should be given. 9
Even Justice Holmes' original statement in Pennsylvania Coal, on which all
subsequent regulatory takings are based, is indeed influenced by this view. 260 He
stated that, "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking.' '261 The corollary to this statement is that
regulations that do not go too far, do not constitute a taking, even though there may
be a loss to a property owner. The reason is simple: "[g]overnment hardly could go
on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without
paying for every such change in the general law. 262 Social welfare gain can justify
a taking to a point, but not in every case. It is a balancing act between what society
should pay for and what individuals should pay for.
One possible solution to the dilemma would be to focus on the intent of the
legislature. Acts of the legislature which are challenged under the Takings Clause
may not have been viewed by the legislature at the time of their drafting as having
anything to do with takings at all. Therefore, it could be argued that, unless
government knowingly undertakes its action to purposefully sidestep the Takings
Clause, such actions should not be compensable takings because society's needs
should be greater than those of the individual. This is because society stands to lose
every time a regulatory takings claim is brought in respect to "innocent"
legislation, and the property owner wins. The situation is exacerbated when
victorious property owners embolden other property owners to follow their
example. When this occurs, society loses, individuals gain, and the courts are
burdened with many takings cases. From the standpoint of republicanism's focus
on what is best for society, regulatory takings should be reviewed only to consider
whether the legislature knowingly intended to avoid the Takings Clause when it
enacted the law at issue. Any review by the courts greater than this would be a
judicial intervention in the legislative decision making process regarding what is
good for society.
B. The Meaning of "Property"
At its foundation, the debate between liberalism and republicanism-and
between "something lost" and "something gained"-focuses on the meaning of the
word "property." As Laura Underkuffler-Freund stated, "[p]roperty describes the
tension between [the] individual and [the] collective ...[and that] tension ... is a
part of the concept of property, itself., 263 The importance of the meaning of
259.
See supra text accompanying notes 52-62, 117-18 (addressing prevention of a nuisance under police
power). See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022 (1992) (citing Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623 (1887)). A frequent example in Australia are laws which work a forfeiture of property as a penalty
for criminal activity. See, e.g., Trade PracticesComm'n v Tooth & Co., (1979) 142 CL.R. 397 (Austl.) (citing
Burton v Honan, [1952] HCA 30; (1952) 86 CLR 169)).
260.
260 U.S. at 415.
261.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 413.
262.
263.
Laura Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 161,
168 (1996).
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"property" is significant in the "something gained" analysis, and how that analysis
relates to regulatory takings. The whole idea of "something gained" assumes that
some "property" was gained. This view has the potential to completely eliminate
the existence of regulatory takings, as any gain of actual property negates the
concept of compensation for mere harm to property. One Australian scholar noted,
"there must be an acquisition, an actual acquiring, not a mere restriction on the use
and enjoyment of proprietary rights. '2 64
More fundamentally, this focus likewise eliminates the argument that the
"gain" sufficient for a taking can constitute social welfare gain. What must be
gained under this understanding is an actual, identifiable property right. It is easy to
see the attraction of such a focus. The seemingly simple formula of finding a taking
only where an identified property right is gained seems fairly straightforward and
easy to apply, and seems to eliminate the problem of "regulatory takings." No
wonder that the Australian High Court has gone down this road.
The problem with this approach is that it assumes an extremely narrow
definition of "property." Indeed, the very way in which it property is defined
relates to the existence of regulatory takings, since a broad definition will include
interests that go far beyond what is usually considered to be traditional property.
The question of how to define property has been debated since the founding.
Drafter of the Fifth Amendment James Madison stated that, "[a man has] property
in the free use of his faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ
them., 265 Then, speaking specifically of takings, he stated:
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it,
where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to
part of its citizens that free use of their faculties, and free choice of
their occupations, which not only constitute their property in the
general sense of the word; but are the means of acquiring property
strictly so called ... If there be a government then which prides
itself in maintaining the inviolability of property; which provides
that none shall be taken directly even for public use without
indemnification to the owner, and yet directly violates the property
which individuals have in their opinions, their religion, their
persons, and their faculties; nay more, which indirectly violates
their property, in their actual possessions, in the labor that acquires
their daily subsistence, and in the hallowed remnant of time which
ought to relieve their fatigues and soothe their cares, the inference
will have been anticipated,
that such a government is not a pattern
266
States.
United
the
for

264.
See LANE, supra note 5, at 163.
265.
The National Gazette (March 29, 1792), reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 101
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900).
266.
Id. at 102-03 (emphasis of the word "directly" in original; emphasis of the word "indirectly" added).
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For Madison, then, property could even include broad concepts, such as a
person's opinions and their faculties.267 The "indirect" violation he referred to
would appear to include regulatory takings.268
Theorists have grappled with the definition of "property" for decades, but have
not reached a common consensus. 269 The simplest and most basic definition, one
that is learned by virtually all first year law students, is that property is a "bundle of
rights" in respect to the outward things of the world.27 °
However, Richard Epstein favors the view of 18th century legal jurist William
Blackstone, who identified property as, "that sole and despotic dominion which
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe." 271 Additionally,
Blackstone said property is "the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his
without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the
acquisitions,
, 272
land.
In contrast, Thomas Grey asserts that the concept of property has become so
fractured that no meaningful definition can be found.273 While on the other hand,
Stephen Munzer notes that a number of scholars view property simply "as a set of
social relations." 274 Leigh Raymond gives an articulation of this definition, by
stating that property is "a social relationship giving an owner power over other
individuals that restricts their control or use of an item or resource., 275 For
Raymond, such a definition is necessary in today's world because of the modern
property rights that do not fit historic property
creation of intangible
276
classifications.
There is no question that modern industrialization and technology have altered
the way "property" is defined. S. Friedman described how the passage of time has
changed how property rights are viewed:
The profound change in the conception of property that has taken
place since the heyday of Roman law should be emphasized at the
outset. Whilst property was originally regarded as an absolute right
of an essentially individualistic character, at the present stage of
267.
See id.
See id.
268.
See Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV 371 (2003)
269.
(describing the different theories of the definition of property).
270.
J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights'"Picture ofProperty, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711,712 (1996).
RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 22 (1985)
271.
(citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 2 (1765)).
272.
Id.
Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegrationof Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69-85 (J. Roland &
273.
John W. Chapman eds. 1980); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 271, at 20-22; STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF
PROPERTY 31-36 (1990).
Stephen R. Munzer, Property as Social Relations, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL
274.
THEORY OF PROPERTY 36 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). Among the scholars listed by Munzer who possess this
view are: Felix S. Cohen, Robert L. Hale, Duncan Kennedy, Joseph William Singer, C.B. Macpherson and
Jennifer Nedelsky.
LEIGH RAYMOND, PRIVATE RIGHTS IN PUBLIC RESOURCES 41 (2003).
275.
Id.
276.
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legal development this aspect has been considerably modified. The
absolute right is replaced by a right that is only relative and is
conditioned more and more by the needs of the community... The
state is led to intervene in the field of private property to an ever
greater extent in consequence of modem technical development.
Modem methods of production and distribution based on the
collective organization of the means of production have tended to
destroy the individualistic framework of the right of property and
have obliged governments to resort to new forms of planning and
regrouping of economic forces ... It follows therefore that States
assume a right of disposal over private property to an ever
increasing extent in spite of legal provisions which are nothing
more than a reflection of obsolete economic conceptions."'
In light of the above, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has adopted a
relatively broad reading of "property. '278 In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,279 in
addressing whether trade secrets constituted "property," the Court stated: "[t]his
general perception of trade secrets as property is consonant with a notion of
'property' that extends beyond land and tangible goods and includes the products
280
of an individual's 'labour and invention.'
The Australian High Court is also in agreement with a broad interpretation of
"property." 281 Australian constitutional scholar Simon Evans has noted that over
the years the High Court has interpreted "property" so broadly that it can mean
almost anything:
[T]he court has given the widest interpretation to "property."
Property includes "innominate and anomalous interests," "any
interest in property" and "every species of valuable right and
Interest." The result is that the acquisition of a bare right to
possession, of "money and the right to receive a payment of
money," and of a chose in action; relief from the Commonwealth's
liability in debt or damages and from a burden on the
Commonwealth's radical title; and "the assumption and indefinite
continuance of exclusive possession and
control ... of any subject
282
(xxxi).
51
s.
within
fall
all
of property"

277.
278.

S. FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-7 (1953).
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).

279.

Id.

280.
Id. at 1002-03 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 405); see generally J. LOCKE, THE
SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, ch. 5 (J. Gough ed. 1947).

281.

See Simon Evans, Constitutional Property Rights in Australia: Reconciling Individual Rights and the

Common Good, in PROTECTING RIGHTS WITHOUT A BILL OF RIGHTS 200 (Tom Campbell, Jeffrey D. Goldsworthy

& Adrienne S.A. Stone eds., 2006).
Id. at 200.
282.
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When such broad interpretations of "property" are utilized, the reason is
usually to protect individual property rights. Indeed, Evans further noted:
Extinguishment or modification of property rights may constitute
an acquisition under s. 5 1(xxxi), even if no one acquires title to (or
an interest in) the property rights that are extinguished or modified,
so long as "some identifiable and measurable countervailing
benefit or advantage" accrues to some other person (whether or not
that person is the Commonwealth). 8 3
Evans postulates that when the Australian acquisition clause is viewed as a
protection, just as with the American Fifth Amendment, then a "something lost"
focus must unavoidably follow. 284 Because of this, "the distinction between
acquisition [something gained] and deprivation [something lost] has been
progressively eroded" in Australia.285
V. THE CHALLENGE OF QUANTIFICATION
One of the attractions of the "something lost" analysis, and a corresponding
problem of the "something gained" view, is that of quantification. Losses to private
property owners from takings are rarely difficult to quantify in terms of a dollars
and cents compensation. Indeed, if a claimant cannot prove that a government
taking caused a financial loss, there is no takings claim.286 On the other hand, gain
is not always that easy to quantify, especially when the gain is to society as a
whole. In Penn Central, for example, the loss to the property owner of rentable
office space from the building it could not build is readily quantifiable. 287 In
contrast, New York City's preservation of historical places is hard to express in
dollars and cents. The same is true in most of the other recent U.S. and Australian
takings cases. 8 Even with Australia's adoption of the "something gained" view, as
Justice Callinan noted, the Australian High Court continues to compensate based
on what is lost rather than what is gained.289
Tasmanian Dam highlights the difficulty of quantification as a factor in
regulatory takings. 290 Since this case involved a government taking from a
government, damages became a real problem. 29' Neither the loss to the State of
Tasmania from not being able to build its dam, nor the "gain" of the

283.

Id. at 199.

284.
285.
286.

See id.
Id.
See Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id. at 116.
See Lingle, 544 U.S. 528; 1CM, (2009) 240 CLR 140.
Smith, (2000) 204 CLR at 547.
Tasmania, (1983) 46 ALR 625.
Id.
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Commonwealth from preventing its building, can be readily quantified.2 92 Societal
gains are hard to nail down in terms of dollars and cents.
Ina way, quantification of individual losses is a misguided principal. From a
republicanism perspective, quantification of individual harm is contrary to the
common good, as it tends to fragment society into parties focused on individual
gain, rather than to build cohesion in society as a collective group more interested
in what is best for all. From this point of view, people should be willing to sacrifice
for the overall good of society, rather than obsess over money and what they are
entitled to or what they lost. The ultimate example of this is seen in the views of
many of the Plains Indian tribes in America before the coming of the white man.293
They avoided the takings problem by refusing to recognize individual rights to real
property.29 4 Since no one owned the land, it simply could not be "taken. 295
As many of the cases in both countries indicated, the place of societal gain in
the takings analysis is somewhat of a mystery. 22996 Following Agins, United States'
courts could find that there was no taking as long as the law in question
substantially advanced a legitimate state goal.297 This approach, very similar to the
current approach in Australia, was terminated by the Lingle case.298 However,
nuisances9 may still be abated under the police power in America without being a
29
taking.
No one can deny that societal gains significantly impact the takings question,
whether we want them to or not. Yet, in a way, the entirety of the takings question
has to do with societal gain. Indeed, this article emphasizes this very point. The
decision of whether to focus on "gain" or "loss" in regulatory takings is essentially
a policy decision, based on whether societal or individual rights should prevail. The
question should really be answered by the people, through the legislative branch of
government. However, this policy decision has simply been assumed by the highest
courts in each country.
VI. WHICH APPROACH IS BEST?

While there are many benefits and problems to both the "gain" and "loss"
approach, it is the opinion of this author that the "something lost" view is probably
more appropriate. When individual property rights are pitted against societal gain,
it is safer to err on the side of preservation of individual rights. This is true even
when the social losses due to such an individualized approach are taken into
292.
Id.
293.
See Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of Common
Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559, 1592 (2001).
294.
Id.

295.
See id.However, they did recognize ownership of personal property. Furthermore, contrary to popular
assumption, many other tribes in other locations in North America did indeed recognize a form of real property
ownership. As for the Australian aborigines, by and large they had a legal structure that "included a system of land
ownership." JOHN CARVAN, UNDERSTANDING THE AUSTRALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 26 (4th ed. 2002).

296.
297.
298.
299.

See Agins, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn Central,438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Agins, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
Lingle, 544 U.S. 528 (2005); see also supra text accompanying notes 109-118.
Id.
at 544.
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account. The main reason for this is summed up in a statement by George Turner,
one of the Australian Founders at the Commonwealth Constitutional Convention in
Melbourne in 1899. 300 In speaking of constitutional grants of power he said, "where
there is a power, the body having that power would probably extend it to its utmost
or a little beyond the strict reading
limit. If they go a little further than we
1
' 30 intended
of the Act, how are we to stop them?
The "something gained" view of takings embraces social gains at the expense
of personal rights. If such a principle were extended "to its utmost limit" as Turner
stated, the results to individual rights could be devastating.30 2 Adopting such an
approach is simply too risky. One of the most important duties of government is to
preserve individual rights, for without them society loses. Society is not a "thing,"
but a composite of individuals. A loss to one individual is not necessarily justified
by a benefit to all. A society which treasures group goals above individual goals
risks losing the very basis of its existence, for individual rights are the very
foundation from which a society and its goals are derived.
An analogy can be made to the adversarial nature of legal proceedings in both
the United States and Australia. A more inefficient and costly system could hardly
be devised. Contending parties must waste thousands of dollars and hours in
asserting their claims through arrogant attorneys who portray the opposing party as
being totally bereft of mental capacity. Meanwhile, each attorney portrays his own
client as a saint, the epitome of goodness. It is left to the judge or jury to decide
who is right. As bothersome, costly, and annoying this process is, it is still better
than the alternative (resorting to a back alley with bared fists) in preserving the
rights and claims of individuals.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States has for years followed a "loss" orientation towards
regulatory takings cases, in which takings analysis has focused almost exclusively
on what the property owner lost. In recent years, Australia has adopted a
"something gained" orientation in regulatory takings cases, finding takings only
when an identifiable gain to the government or some party has occurred. Both
approaches have strengths and weaknesses. The "something lost" approach accords
roughly with the liberalism theory of government, which champions individual
rights over societal goals. The "something gained" approach accords with the
republicanism theory of government, which prefers societal gains to individual
ones. Because of the risk of government overreaching and loss of protection to
individual property rights, the "something lost" approach is almost certainly the
preferable one.
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